In opening the workshop, Dr. David Michaels, Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety, and Health noted that the chemical accident rate is actually increasing across the DOE complex. Indeed, the week before the conference, an explosion involving sodium-potassium alloy (NaK) hospitalized several workers at a facility in Oak Ridge, TN. Michaels left a clear impression that he will pressure DOE line management and contractors to improve chemical safety performance.

While this attitude is most welcome to many in the DOE complex, the actual mechanics of encouraging chemical safety within the nuclear weapons agency are uncertain. In the Department's administrative structure, the environment, safety, and health staff have no direct control over either contractor or government behavior. Most management and public concern focuses on accidental nuclear reactions - criticality risks like the September incident at a Japanese fuels reprocessing plant.

The uncertain position of chemical safety contrasts with the serious chemically-initiated risks posed by DOE facilities. One of the most concerning developments mentioned by DOE insiders is the potential for a chemical explosion inside one of the high-level nuclear waste tanks at Hanford in Washington state. Some of these tanks produce so much gas (from radiolytic decomposition of organic solvents in the waste) that they regularly "burp" flammable materials from their depths. Many in the DOE environment, safety, and health community are concerned about their inability to force line management to adequately assess and control chemical risks.

Much of the discussion at the conference centered on whether a "driver" - a DOE directive or other regulatory impetus - was needed to force chemical safety onto the same stage as nuclear safety. The issue has simmered within the Department for some time.

Chemical safety must take its place alongside cost, long-term environmental effects and nuclear risks at DOE. Serious study of DOE chemical safety - well-presented by those attending the conference - must be followed by serious action on the part of DOE's leadership. Tthe Secretary must give clear direction to the line and to the safety cadre that they are expected to work in partnership instead of in isolation. The alternative is to have an accident which will not only draw strong public ire but also force directives to foce the interaction of safety personnel and line management.