(PATERSON, NEW JERSEY – July 18, 2000) – Investigators from the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) have concluded that the April 1998 explosion at Morton Specialty Chemical’s (now Rohm and Haas) Paterson, New Jersey facility likely could have been prevented had the company’s safety program for reactive chemicals followed recommended industry safety practices. The blast injured nine workers and released chemicals into the neighboring community.

Board Member Andrea Kidd Taylor noted that the presentation by CSB’s investigation team today represented staff conclusions. The findings of fact and the recommendations to prevent similar incidents are not finalized until they have been reviewed and accepted by vote of the Board.

CSB’s lead investigator, David Heller, William Hoyle, Director of the Office of Investigations and Safety Programs, and Richard Wedlich of Chilworth Technology, Inc. presented the investigation team’s findings in a public meeting at the Paterson City Hall. The meeting is known as a “Public Review of Findings”.

Runaway Chemical Reaction

The Paterson plant manufactures a series of dye products. The explosion and fire occurred during the production of Yellow 96 Dye, which was used to tint petroleum fuel products. A 2,000-gallon kettle being used to produce the dye experienced an uncontrolled rapid temperature and pressure rise (runaway chemical reaction) which resulted in the explosion, injuries and release of material into the community. Yellow 96 Dye was produced by the mixing and reaction of two chemicals, ortho-nitrochlorobenzene (o-NCB) and 2-ethylhexylamine (2-EHA).

Heller said the safety programs that were used by Morton for managing reactive chemical hazards did not uncover the potential for the catastrophic runaway chemical reaction in the production of Yellow 96 Dye.

CSB investigators also found that important safety information and recommendations about the hazards of the Yellow 96 Dye process discovered by Morton’s United Kingdom research facility were not made known to development and production people at the Paterson facility. This resulted in design flaws and omissions in the kettle and operating instructions used to produce the dye.

For example, investigators found that the kettle did not have the cooling capacity to safely control the temperature of the reaction if reasonably foreseeable upsets occurred. The kettle also was not equipped with safety equipment, such as a quench system or a reactor dump system, to stop the process in the event of a runaway reaction. In addition, a high-pressure relief device was far too small to safely vent the contents of the kettle in the event that an uncontrollable runaway reaction took place.

Investigators further determined that company training and operating procedures did not prepare operators to safely operate the process to produce the dye or when to evacuate the facility. Some of those injured had stayed near the kettle even while pressure was building uncontrollably and the vessel was rumbling and showing other signs of an impending explosion. Procedures and training did not give sufficient direction to ensure that personnel evacuated prior to an explosion.

Recommendations

Investigators presented several recommendations to the Board members, who in turn will decide whether to adopt them in their present form, modify them, or substitute others.

In addition to recommendations to Morton, investigators proposed that the Board adopt a recommendation to the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that they issue joint guidelines for the control of reactive chemical process hazards. They noted that existing federal safety standards do not provide sufficient guidance for reactive chemical process safety.

Staff also urged the Board to recommend to OSHA and EPA that they participate in a CSB “hazard investigation” of reactive chemical process safety. Unlike an investigation of a particular incident such as the one at Morton, the proposed CSB hazard investigation would examine a series of related incidents to identify common incident causes so that the Board may make recommendations for preventing them in the future. This hazard investigation, if approved by Board members, will result in further recommendations for preventing incidents similar to the 1998 explosion at Morton. Investigators also suggested that the CSB seek input from interested parties regarding the design and conduct of the hazard investigation.

Unlike incident investigations conducted by regulatory agencies, federal law prohibits the CSB from affixing blame or levying fines or other penalties. Instead, Congress created the CSB to contribute to improved chemical safety by conducting incident investigations, determining all the possible causes, and producing high-quality reports and special studies. From the results of investigations and studies the CSB adopts recommendations to prevent future incidents, submitting them as appropriate to agencies, organizations, companies and other bodies. The CSB vigorously advocates action in support of its recommendations by working with recipients and through other means.

"This meeting gave the public and interested stakeholders the opportunity to observe the investigators’ transfer of their findings to the Board. The Board will formally review the report, modify it if required, and vote to adopt and publish the findings and recommendations by the end of August," Taylor said.

Investigation Important to Community, Industry

"The Board's work in this investigation is important to the families and communities that were affected by this incident, and it is also important to the chemical industry to help it gain knowledge that will contribute to safe operations and accident prevention. The report on the Morton incident should also contribute to the body of knowledge relating to improving the safety of chemical processes involving reactive chemicals,” Taylor said.

Taylor also acknowledged with appreciation the assistance of all those who assisted and participated in the investigation. In particular she cited the help of the Passaic County Department of Health; the City of Paterson Police and Fire Departments; EPA Region II; OSHA’s Hasbrouck Heights, New Jersey area office; Morton Specialty Chemical; and the Paper Allied-Industrial Chemical and Energy Workers International Union.

The meeting was open to the public and the Board invited oral comments from the public after the presentations by the CSB investigation team. The Board welcomes written comments from the public and will keep the record open to receive them until July 21st.

People wishing to submit written comments to the Board may do so by writing the CSB at its Washington, D.C. headquarters (Attn: Morton Investigation Comments), 2175 K. Street, NW, Suite 400, Washington, DC 20037), or by sending electronic mail to comments@csb.gov.

Additional information about the CSB and its activities may be found at http://www.chemsafety.gov. The Morton investigation page is http://www.chemsafety.gov/1998/inv/98006nj.htm