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CSB Press Release






             
     

CSB Releases Safety Bulletin Emphasizing Dangers of Working on Piping and Equipment That May Contain Flammable or Chemically Reactive Material

Washington, DC, July 15, 2004 – The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) today released a Safety Bulletin calling on chemical plant and refinery operators to exercise appropriate caution when performing work on piping and equipment that could contain hazardous materials.

The bulletin, set to be considered by the Board at a public meeting today, results from the CSB’s investigation into a January 13, 2004, explosion and fire at the Huntsman Petrochemical facility in Port Neches, Texas, where two employees were seriously burned and significant damage occurred to nearby equipment. The explosion and fire occurred as workers attempted to purge a thousand-foot-long chemical process pipe in preparation for a cutting and welding operation.
Huntsman managers and workers were aware of the importance of completely removing hazardous material before cutting into the piping, and relevant warnings were contained in the company’s written operating procedures. In this incident, workers first purged the piping with nitrogen to force out residual chemicals, including a hazardous mixture of peroxide and alcohol that reacts violently when heated. But unknown to the workers, the piping included a 300-foot-long section that was three feet lower than the rest of the piping, and despite the nitrogen purge, a significant amount of the hazardous mixture remained trapped.
The next step in the operation was to use high-temperature steam to purge the piping of what workers believed would be a small amount of residual flammable hydrocarbon vapor. But the steam heated the peroxide that was trapped in the low section of piping. The peroxide then began to decompose, releasing heat and creating intense pressure. The pressure blew out a valve gasket and violently ruptured the pipe. Flammable vapors shot out of the openings and ignited into a large fireball, injuring plant workers.

After the accident, Huntsman found two drains in the low section of the pipe, which could have been used to remove the trapped liquid. Had Huntsman’s procedures called for reviewing plant pipe drawings and physically walking the entire line within the work boundaries, the accident would likely have been avoided, CSB said.

CSB’s Safety Bulletin points out that chemical plant and refinery operators routinely open piping to perform maintenance, change components, or reroute lines. The Bulletin states, “Safe work practices dictate the removal or mechanical isolation of hazardous material from piping and equipment … before commencing work.”

Under “Lessons Learned,” the Bulletin notes that work involving the opening of chemical process pipes should never be considered routine. The Bulletin recommends that facilities should:
      - Physically examine all piping and components between isolation devices such as valves, and be sure piping drawings are current
     - Use the drawings to identify key components, such as low-point drains that can be used to remove dangerous chemicals
     - Prepare a specific written procedure for removing hazardous material and consider the consequences of working on piping that is not completely purged.

CSB investigators conducted a three-day investigation of the January incident. Huntsman personnel also investigated the event and identified a number of corrective actions.

CSB is an independent federal agency charged with investigating industrial chemical accidents. The agency’s board members are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. CSB investigations look into all aspects of chemical accidents, including physical causes such as equipment failure as well as inadequacies in safety management systems.  The Board does not issue citations or fines but does make safety recommendations to plants, industry organizations, labor groups, and regulatory agencies such as OSHA and EPA. Further information about CSB is available from www.csb.gov. For more information, contact Sandy Gilmour (Public Affairs Contractor), 202-261-7614 or 202-251-5496 (cell), or Daniel Horowitz, 202-261-7613.

CSB Releases Safety Bulletin Warning of Dangers of Sodium Hydrosulfide (NaHS) in the Workplace; Outlines Safe Practices to Prevent Harm

Washington, DC, July 15, 2004 – The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) today released a Safety Bulletin that warns of the dangers of sodium hydrosulfide and recommends safe practices to prevent accidents when handling the chemical.

CSB investigators uncovered 45 accidents associated with sodium hydrosulfide that have caused 32 deaths and 176 injuries since 1971. They noted, however, that accident data are incomplete and there may have been additional deaths and injuries attributable to the chemical. The Safety Bulletin is an outgrowth of the Board’s investigation of a January 2002 accident involving sodium hydrosulfide that caused two deaths and eight injuries at an Alabama paper mill.
Sodium hydrosulfide, known by its chemical symbol NaHS (often pronounced “nash”) is used in the leather tanning, pulp and paper, chemical, dye, and mineral extraction industries. NaHS is used as a pure solid (flake) or more commonly as a solution in water.

The Safety Bulletin points out that when NaHS is inadvertently combined with acid materials, deadly hydrogen sulfide gas is produced. Such inadvertent mixing can occur in a chemical process sewer, for example. Hydrogen sulfide gas has the characteristic smell of rotten eggs. The bulletin notes that hydrogen sulfide is insidious, because even moderate exposures impair a human’s ability to smell the gas by deadening the nerves in the nose. Health effects from inhalation range from shortness of breath and severe lung damage at lower concentrations (50-150 parts per million in air) to rapid unconsciousness and death at higher levels (800-1,000 parts per million).

The Bulletin describes several common themes in NaHS incidents: spills, leaks, or inadvertent mixing that bring NaHS solutions into contact with acid; engineering controls that are inadequate, including lack of detection devices or ventilation systems; and inappropriate emergency response, where workers and responders may rush to help a fallen worker before sampling the air or donning protective gear.

The CSB Bulletin noted that companies handling NaHS must provide workers with material safety data sheets to apprise them of the chemical’s potential danger. However, the CSB found that the hazard information in MSDSs varies significantly among NaHS manufacturers. The CSB recommended that companies that use NaHS review safety information from several sources, including the CSB Safety Bulletin, to gain a full understanding of the hazards.

The Bulletin urges companies to reduce NaHS hazards through engineering and design improvements and lists specific ways that companies can improve NaSH safety, such as air monitoring, safe storage, and proper use of protective gear. The Safety Bulletin was to be considered for final approval by the full Board at a public meeting in Washington today.

CSB is an independent federal agency charged with investigating industrial chemical accidents. The agency’s board members are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. CSB investigations look into all aspects of chemical accidents, including physical causes such as equipment failure as well as inadequacies in safety management systems. The Board does not issue citations or fines but does make safety recommendations to plants, industry organizations, labor groups, and regulatory agencies such as OSHA and EPA. Further information about CSB is available from www.csb.gov. For more information, contact Sandy Gilmour (Public Affairs Contractor), 202-261-7614 or 202-251-5496 (cell), or Daniel Horowitz, CSB 202-261-7613.


CSB Presents Plan for Expanded Recommendations Implementation Program

Washington, DC, July 15, 2004 — Senior staff from the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) presented their plans for an expanded Recommendations Program to Board Members in a public meeting in Washington this morning. The Recommendations Program is charged with achieving the implementation of the recommendations that arise from completed chemical accident investigations. The program will also play an important role in the increased outreach activities of the CSB.

Dr. Manuel Gomez, who joined the CSB as Director of Recommendations earlier this summer, and Jordan Barab, Senior Recommendations Specialist, presented the Recommendations Program update. They outlined plans for a more comprehensive program through vigorous pursuit of open recommendations, improved dissemination of information, implementation of a new tracking system for recommendations, and a broader CSB outreach program.

CSB Chairman Carolyn Merritt said, “Following investigations into the root and contributing causes of industrial chemical accidents, the CSB issues recommendations to companies, state and federal agencies, industry associations, and others. The CSB hopes that other similar accidents can be prevented through the implementation of these recommendations. Successfully implementing these recommendations is a critical part of the Board’s mission.”
At today’s meeting, the CSB noted that the Environmental Protection Agency has recently acted on a major recommendation from the Board’s 2002 reactive hazard investigation. The EPA now requires reporting of reactive chemical incidents under its Risk Management Program, which will allow better tracking and evaluation of incidents at thousands of facilities around the nation. The Board voted to close this recommendation based on “acceptable action.”

“EPA’s recent rulemaking action on reporting is an example of the progress our recommendations are making across the country. We are excited to pursue broader implementation of safety recommendations, which is vital to the mission of the agency. With a strong outreach plan, the information gained from our accident investigations will be used even more broadly to prevent accidents,” Dr. Gomez said. Dr. Gomez said the team would work with stakeholders to ensure that the appropriate organizations are made aware of the CSB’s efforts to improve safety whenever chemicals are used in industry.

Dr. Gomez brings over 25 years of multi-disciplinary experience in occupational and environmental health and safety to the CSB. He has previously worked as a consultant, director of the scientific affairs division of a non-profit organization, professor, researcher, and compliance officer. He is a Certified Industrial Hygienist, a member of numerous professional societies, and the author of a book and several scientific papers and presentations.

The CSB is an independent federal agency charged with investigating industrial chemical accidents. CSB investigations look into all aspects of chemical accidents, including physical causes such as equipment failure as well as inadequacies in safety management systems. Typically, the investigations involve extensive witness interviews, examination of physical evidence, and chemical and forensic testing.

The Board does not issue citations or fines but does make safety recommendations to plants, industry organizations, labor groups, and regulatory agencies such as OSHA and EPA. Further information about the CSB is available from www.csb.gov. For more information, contact Kara Wenzel at 202-261-7642.

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