AcuSafe Home Page
-> October Newsletter
  

    

Accra Pac Group Ethylene Oxide Explosion Investigation Report






             
     

 
EPA investigated an explosion and fire that occurred at the Accra Pac Group, Inc., North Plant Facility located in Elkhart, Indiana. The incident took place on June 24, 1997 killing one employee, injuring 59 others and prompting the evacuation of a 1-mile radius around the plant. The Accra Pac facility produces various pressurized containers, most of which are consumer aerosol products such as hair sprays and deodorants.

The explosion took place in the Gas House, which consists of a feed system where ethylene oxide liquid from a storage tank is brought through a stainless steel pipe to the Gas House at 55-65 pounds-per-square-inch-gauge pressure (psig). In the Gas House, ethylene oxide is fed into the Graco pump, which is a feed-booster pump, where ethylene oxide is pressurized to 600-650 psig and then sent to the "under-the-cup" filling machine.

In the afternoon of June 24, 1997, the pump that supplied breathing air to the operator in the Gas House stopped. Unable to breathe without supplied breathing air, the operator was forced to quickly shut down the filling operation and leave the Gas House. When the pump was fixed and the operator returned to restart the process, he noticed that an alarm indicating a high level of hydrocarbon vapor had been triggered, exceeding 40% of the lower explosive limit (LEL). As the operator exited the Gas House to investigate the alarm, a large explosion occurred. The EPA Chemical Accident Investigation Team (CAIT) believes that the explosion was caused by ethylene oxide vapor that had accumulated in the Gas House. The vapor exceeded the LEL and contacted an ignition source that initiated the explosion.

Root Causes

EPA identified the following root causes to the incident:

  • Inadequate shut-down procedure
  • Location of the reclamation tank inside the occupied Gas House
  • Lack of instrumentation to indicate the level of ethylene oxide in the tank
  • Lack of sufficient barriers or separation spacing between the Gas House and the Production Building
  • Insufficient explosion venting to permit adequate pressure release
  • Inadequate door design
  • Use of electrical equipment that did not meet National Electrical Code (NEC) requirements


Recommendations

  • Establish safe emergency shutdown devices and procedures for all operations.
  • Relocate the reclamation tank to a location outside the Gas House to reduce the amount of hazardous material inside the occupied building.
  • Develop a way to monitor the quantity of material in the reclamation tank.
  • Install a non-return check valve on the reclamation tank.
  • Properly locate and provide sufficient barriers between units that have a potential for explosion from other processes in accordance with NFPA 30, 5-3.2.2.
  • Provide adequate deflagration venting capability for the Gas House.
  • Evaluate doors to ensure outward swing action and latches that easily release under slight internal pressure.
  • Limit the electrical equipment in the Gas House to those that meet the NEC rating for the type of material being processed.
  • Ensure the maximum reliability of breathing air systems.
  • Relocate the feed charge pump (Graco or similar).
  • Perform process hazard analysis.

A copy of the full report is available at the EPA web site, but be prepared for long load times (.PDF, 11 MB).


AcuSafe is a presentation of AcuTech Consulting, ©2002, All Rights Reserved