Following are some of the specific shortcomings of S.1602 according to API:

• "S.1602 reverses the roles of government and industry by providing the EPA with the authority to dictate appropriate manufacturing practices, while industry is mandated to prevent terrorism. S.1602 makes it a crime to be a victim of a terrorist attack or criminal act.
• S.1602 focuses on chemical hazards and not risk scenarios posed by terrorism. September 11th taught us that terrorists select targets based on a number of objectives, not solely on public impact. Principally their targets have included symbols of American economic and military strength. 
• S.1602 relies on the concept of mandated "Inherent Safety." Although "Inherent Safety" sounds good in theory, in practice it is mostly impractical to apply to existing facilities. Changes to part of a petroleum process can have unintended consequences in other parts of the process. Risk shifting has been a common problem of mandated Inherent Safety. For example, by mandating a reduction of product inventory at a fixed-facility, more product deliveries are needed. While you may reduce the risk of a release to the local community around the facility, you may in fact increase the overall risk by increasing the number of on-road transportation activities required to maintain the required product feed needed for production. 
• S.1602 mandates product substitution for petroleum products. Product substitution is not practical in our industry. Petroleum products are capable of heating our homes and powering our vehicles because of their flammable and combustible properties. At this time, there are no substitutes that do not have similar chemical properties. Mandating Inherent Safety will not change the flammable/combustible properties of these products. 
• S.1602 could mandate the use of buffer zones to protect against terrorist attacks. Establishing buffer zones does not prevent terrorism. Buffer zones are a local government land use practice. In fact, it is not practical in most cases to establish buffer zones around existing facilities. 
• S.1602 could mandate transportation buffer zones that virtually exclude the movement of petroleum products anywhere within the United States. Though the bill uses the words "to extent practicable," it opens the door to local interpretation of where gasoline transportation could take place and result in impacts to the supply of product to gasoline stations that could be near the "buffer zones." 
• DOT must maintain jurisdiction over transportation safety and security issues. Hazardous materials are moved with a high degree of safety, which can be attributed to the uniform authority of the Hazardous Material Regulations (HMR) across the country and the expertise of the DOT in writing and enforcing those rules. S.1602 would create confusion and duplicative roles for EPA and DOT regarding transportation of hazardous materials and would disrupt the national uniformity of current DOT regulations. The negative impact on interstate commerce resulting from variations among state and local regulations would significantly disturb industry operations and complicate compliance obligations while not significantly decreasing the threat of terrorism or criminal acts."

The above excerpts are have been extracted from the "Written Statement Of The American Petroleum Institute Before The Senate Environment And Public Works Committee Subcommittee On Superfund, Toxics, Risk & Waste Management Hearing On S.1602", November 15, 2001

To see complete documentation of API's reaction (in .pdf format), click here.

Go to the next section of this Feature:  Part 6: ACC Testimony

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